Why have interest rates been so volatile? by Paul Evans
I
Paul Evans·
On October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve
announced that henceforth it would tightly
control the money supply while letting the
Federal-funds rate respond freely to market
forces. The Federal Reserve hoped that this
policy change would help it to stabilize
employment and real income while bringing
inflation down to a tolerable level.
The Federal Reserve did indeed free the
Federal-funds rate - the rate clearly was
much more volatile after October 6, 1979
than it was before that date, as can be seen
from Panel a of Figure 1. That action,
however, has produced no clear victory against
inflation, and 1980 could hardly be considered
a year of great stability in the real economy.
Furthermore, both short-term and long-term
interest rates have become much more
volatile, as panels band c ofFigure 1 demon-
strate.
Volatile interest rates - especially volatile
long-term rates - may impose burdens on the
real economy. Savers may find their portfolios
riskier, and may therefore save less and shift
from long-term to short-term securities.!
Purchasers of houses, plant and equipment,
and other long-lived physical assets may then
be forced to finance their purchases with short-
term debt, thus making these purchases
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riskier. Ifthe additional risk reduces long-term
investment as well as saving, the economy will
experience less capital formation, and a
smaller portion ofthat capital formation will go
into long-lived assets. As a result, the econ-
omy's growth rate will slacken.
This paper investigates how much of the
recent increase in interest-rate volatility
stemmed from the change in monetary policy of
October 6, 1979. It finds that this policy
change produced only about 30 percent of the
increased volatility in long-term interest rates,
and that the rest came from sources not
directly under Federal Reserve control.
Almost all ofthis 30 percent resulted from the
Fed's adherence to its monetary targets; by
itself, the freeing ofthe funds rate had little to
do with the increased rate volatility.
Therefore, panel c ofFigure 1 gives a mislead-
ing picture of the new monetary policy's
impact on rate volatility and hence on invest-
ment and growth. The actual effect was sub-
stantially smaller.
The next section of this paper formulates a
model ofinterest rates, and Sections II and III
discuss the estimates resulting from the fitting
of this model to weekly U.S. data. Next, Sec-
tion IV decomposes the recent increase in
interest-rate volatility into several compo-
nents, and discusses each of those compo-
nents. Finally, Section V summarizes the
















I. Formulation of an Empirical Model
To begin, we formulate a model based on
the hypothesis that the securities markets are
efficient. 2 Simply speaking, the efficient-
markets hypothesis claims that readily availa-
ble information is so efficiently processed t4at
no market participant can do systematically
better than any other participant.
Samuelson (1965) and Sargent (1976) have
shown that, to a close approximation, interest
rates in an efficient market respond
immediately and completely to any new infor-
mation reaching the bond markets. The reason
is that interest-rate changes generate capital
gains or losses, which dominate the short-
period returns to all but the shortest-term
bonds. 3 Ifinterest rates in fact changed slowly
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in response to new information, a savvy inves-
tor could use that information accurately to
predict future capital gains or losses. Being
able to make accurate predictions would be a
veritable license to print money, because the
investor could hold bonds when they were
going to rise in price and sell them short when
they were going to fall in price. For example, if
the investor knew that government deficits
raise interest rates gradually, he or she would
react to an unusually low deficit by buying
bonds and to an unusually high deficit by seil-
ing them short. By the time the interest rate
actually changed, he or she would probably
have made a fortune.
The efficient-markets hypothesis essentiallyassumes that a large number ofsavvy investors
participate in the securities markets.
Therefore, when these investors think, on the
basis of new information, that interest rates
will rise and hence that bond prices will drop,
their efforts to sell their bonds immediately
will drive up interest rates. In principle, the
rise will be so rapid that no one can manage to
sell a single bond before interest rates rise as
far as they are going to rise.
The efficient-markets hypothesis implies
that DR, the interest-rate change, is given
approximately by
where K is a parameter, B is a vector of
parameters, E is a vector of new information
used in the empirical analysis, and V is an error
term that captures the effects ofall other infor-
mation and that moves independently of E.
The longer the term to maturity of the bond,
the better is the approximation.
By definition, new information is that part of
current information that was not known in the
past. In order to give content to this definition,
we must add an hypothesis about knowledge
- namely, that one part of currently available
information can be predicted from past infor-
mation with the use of standard econometric
techniques, and the other part (to be called
"new information") cannot be so predicted.
Specifically, let Z be the vector of variables
used in the empirical analysis. Then, if bond-
market participants knew Z(-1), the value ofZ
in the previous period, they would predict Z as
AZ(-1), where A is a matrix of coefficients
obtained by regression Z on Z(_1).4 Therefore,
E, the vector of new information about Z, is
simply the error vector in the equation
Note that E is serially uncorrelated, because
past values ofE are known by assumption and
serial correlation would imply (contrary to
assumption) that past values ofE are useful in
predicting current values ofE. Similarly, V in
equation (1) should be serially uncorrelated
because it, too, is new information that should
not depend on such information as its own past
history.
Equations (1) and (2) suggest the following
strategy. First, collect some series that are
readily available (say, from government pub-
lications). Then estimate prediction equations,
like (2) , for these series and obtain the
residuals, which are consistent estimates ofE.
Finally, regress changes in various interest
rates on these residuals to obtain consistent
estimates of K and B in equation (1). If the
efficient-markets hypothesis is correct, past
information should not change interest rates.
Therefore, this hypothesis is refuted ifany lag-
ged E's have statistical significance in equation
(1) or if V is serially correlated.
(2) Z = AZ(-1) + E.
(1) DR = K + BE + V,
Bond-market participants surely pay atten-
tion to a great many series of data - such as
real GNP, the inflation rate, the government
deficit, corporate credit demands, and mone-
tary-policy variables. However, many ofthese
series cannot be used here, because they are
not available on a weekly basis. Moreover,
since this paper is mainly concerned with the
impactofmonetary policy on interest rates, we
limit the analysis to appropriate monetary
series.
We assume that GM, the growth rate ofthe
(unadjusted) 5 money supply (M-1B) , and
II. Prediction Equations
DFFR, the change in the Federal-funds rate,
adequately characterize monetary policy. To
extract the new information from these series,
one must estimate prediction equations that
relate them to past information known by
bond-market participants. Essentially, one
must estimate an equation system ofthe form
(2) - first for the sample period extending
from the first full week of 1977 to the last full
week before October 6, 1979, and again for the
sample period extending from the first full
week after October 6, 1979, to the week end-
ing on October 22, 1980.6 Using the
9methodology advocated by Box and Jenkins
(1976),7 we obtained the following results for
the sample period before October 6, 1979 (the
figures in parentheses are standard errors):
GM = GM(-52) + .00126 + EM
(.000203)




2 S.E. = .006013, R = .357;
DFFR = .0515 + 4.72EM(-l) + EFFR
(.0114) 0.89) (4)
2 S.E. = .1361, R = .042;
where EM is a residual from the regression for
the money growth rate, EFFR is a residual
from the regression for the Federal-funds rate,
and (- i) attached to a symbol indicates that it
is lagged i weeks.
For the sample period after October 6,1979,
we obtained
GM = (-52) + .000413 + EM
(.001201)
.290 EM(-1) + .587 EM(-13)
(.137) (.175)














- 2.07 DRI0YR(-2) + EFFR,
(0.67)
2 S.E., = .7158, R = .478;
where DR3MO is the weekly difference in the
three-month Treasury-bill rate, DR12MO is
the weekly difference in the twelve-month
Treasury-bill rate, and DRI0YR is the weekly
difference in the ten-year Treasury bond rate.
Even though equations (3) and (4) or equa-
tions (5) and (6) may not look like the equa-
tion system (2), it is easy to show that they
take that form. 8This is because EM and EFFR
in equations (3) - (6) are unknown only until
GM and DFFR become known.
Equations (3) and (5) imply that only three
kinds ofeffects are relevant in determining the
money-supply growth rate in any given week.
First, if all other effects are zero, GM equals
GM(-52), the value that it assumed in the
same week of the previous year9• Thus, GM
tends to keep any weekly seasonal pattern it
has assumed. Second, the term EM combines
all ofthe influences on the money growth rate
that could not have been predicted in the pre-
vious week. Third, the terms in lagged values
of EM determine how GM will tend to move
the year after EM has assumed a non-zero
value.
To illustrate, suppose that EM rises by one
percentage point in the first week of January
some year, but is left unchanged in all other
weeks. Equation (3) implies that the money
growth rate is one percentage point higher in
the first week ofJanuary ofthat year, .673 per-
centage points lower in the second week of
January, .232 percentage points higher in the
first week of April, .156 percentage points
lower in the second week of April, and is
unchanged in all other weeks of the year. At
year's end the money supply is .403 (=I -
.673 + .232 - .156) percentage points higher
than at the end of the previous year. Conse-
quently, the average annual money growth
rate rises by .403 percentage points. Moreover,since money growth will follow this same
scenario in future years - note that GM
(-52), the growth rate one year earlier,
appears in the right-hand member ofequation
(3) - average money growth also rises by .403
percentage points in every future year.
A similar calculation using equation (5)
yields a money growth rate that is one percen-
tage point higher in the first week ofJanuary,
.290 percentage points lower in the second
week ofJanuary, .587 percentage points higher
in the first week of J 70
points lower in the second week ofApril, .493
percentage points higher in the first week of
July, and .143 percentage points lower in the
second week of July. The money growth rate
also follows this same pattern in every future
year; the average rate rises by 1.477 (=1 -
.290 + .587 - .170 + .493 .143) percen-
tage points.
It is important to note that a monetary
surprise (EM;z!'O) permanently changes the
growth rate of the money supply and not just
its level. A positive surprise raises the growth
rate; a negative surprise lowers the growth
rate.
The results suggest that the Federal
Reserve, before October 6, 1979, would have
responded to a monetary surprise of one per-
centage point by raising the Federal-funds rate
only about 4.72 basis points. (See equation
(4).) No other variable was helpful in predict-
ing changes in the funds rate. Surprises in the
funds rate were usually small: about two-thirds
of them were between -13.61 and +13.61
basis points. This fact demonstrates that the
Federal Reserve more or less pegged the
Federal-funds rate and responded sluggishly to
monetary surprises.
The results also suggest a quite different
Federal Reserve response since October 6,
1979 (See equation (6).) In this period, the
Federal-funds rate responded to monetary
surprises with a two-week lag rather than a
one-week lag, and the response was much
larger. Furthermore, lagged interest rates
began to affect the funds rate.
The two-week lags in equation (6) have
special significance. For a number of years,
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reserve requirements have been lagged two
weeks, rather than imposed contem-
poraneously. This institutional feature implies
that an increase in the money supply, and
hence deposits, generates an increase in
demand for reserves two weeks later. For this
reason, the Federal-funds rate will tend to rise
two weeks later unless the Federal Reserve
completely accommodates this increase in
demand. Therefore, because EM(- 2) had no
statistically significant effect on the funds rate
Ocllobl;lr6, 1979, theFederal Reserve in
that period must have largely accommodated
changes in the demand for reserves. Since
then, however, the Federal Reserve has
apparently let the banks largely fend for them-
selves, for EM(- 2) has alatge and statistically
significant coefficient in equation (6).
The two-week lag on the interest-rate terms
suggests that these rates affect the Federal-
funds rate by operating first on the demand for
reserves. For example, a change in bond rates
might drive businesses to borrow more from
the banks, and this in turn would push up the
demand for reserves two weeks later. This
explanation, however, would lead to the con-
clusion that business-loan demand is roughly
independent of the level of interest rates
(-0.93 + 3.05 - 2.07 is roughly zero), but
rises when the term structure becomes more
humped (the twelve-month Treasury-bill rate
rises relative to the three-month Treasury-bill
rate and the ten-year Treasury-bond rate.)
Equations (4) and (6) provide one more
insight. Since October 6, 1979, the Federal
Reserve has evinced a much greater willing-
ness to tolerate large movements in the
Federal-funds rate: the standard error rises
from .1361 percent a year in equation (4) to
.7158 percent a year in equation (6). The
"T~."t" .. movement in the funds as well as
the Federal Reserve's apparent willingness to
let the banks bear some ofthe brunt ofadjust-
ment in the market for reserves, suggests only
one conclusion: the Federal Reserve tried
much harder to contol the money supply after
October 6, 1979 than it ever did before.
Nevertheless, the short-term variability ofthe
money supply has also risen (the standarderror of equation (5) is larger than that of
equation (3) ). Moreover, movements in the
money supply have become more persistent,
as we have seen in our analysis of equations
(3) and (5).
III. Interest-Rate Equations
The residuals EM and EFFR represent
"new information" about monetary policy. In
this section, we estimate how bond markets
have used this new information in setting
interest rates, and then test whether these
markets are efficient.
In Equation (1), DR referred to changes in
end-of-period (say, end-of-week) interest
rates. Our interest-rate data, however, are not
end-of-week data, but rather averages of daily
data for weeks beginning on Sundays and end-
ing on Saturdays. This complication, and two
others discussed below, imply that the
appropriate equation is:
DR = k + bEM(-1) + cEM(-2)
+ dEFFR(+ 1) + eEFFR + V, (7)
where DR is the difference in the bond rate
averaged over weeks beginning on Sundays
and ending on Saturdays; k, b, c, d and e are
parameters; and V is an error term. In this
Figure B
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12equation, EM(-1), EM(- 2) , EFFR(+1)
and EFFR take the place of E, and the error
term V is serially correlated, unlike its coun-
terpart in equation (1). To be specific, V
should be a first-order moving
average. 10 The Federal Reserve generally
releases M-IB data with an eight-or nine-day
lag. Moreover, these data are averages ofdaily
data for weeks ending on Wednesdays rather
than Saturdays. For this reason, the bond
markets know only EM(- 2) during the first
few days of any week, and then learn
EM(-1). 11 Therefore, both EM(-1) and
EM(- 2) belong in equation (7).
The Federal-funds rate data used to fit equa-
tions (4) and (6) are averaged over weeks end-
ing on Wednesdays. Since bond-market parti-
cipants probably keep track of the funds rate
on an hour-to-hour (or even minute-to-
minute) basis, they already know part ofEFFR
before the week begins on Sunday, and then
learn part ofEFFR(+1) before the week ends
on Saturday. Therefore, including EFFR(+1)
andEFFR in equation (7) is appropriate. 12
We used Treasury-bill and Treasury-bond
rate data, as well as the residuals from equa-
tions (3) - (6), to fit equation (7) for the sam-
ple periods before and after October 6, 1979.
According to the efficient-markets hypothesis,
including EM(-3), EM(-4), EFFR(-l),
EFFR(- 2), etc., in equation (7) - or specify-
ing its error term to be a second (or higher)
order moving average - should add no
statistically significant explanatory power. We
have found this hypothesis to be true for the
long-term interest rates. The regressions for
Figure C









13some of the short-term interest rates,
however, improved somewhat when we
lengthened their lags or error-term struc-
tures. 13 Tables 3 and 4 report the best regres-
sions. 14 Table 1 summarizes those results,
which have the following implications.
1. Unexpected monetary increases tend to
raise interest rates, and unexpected monetary
decreases tend to lower them - contrary to a
common belief among economists. In that
popular view, ifthe Federal Reserve increases
the money supply and nothing else happens,
the public will hold more money than it wants.
In the short run, incomes and goods prices will
not change very much; therefore, interest
rates must fall to make the public content to
hold the increased money supply. That
analysis is faulty, however, perhaps because it
assumes that the stock ofmoney rises because
the Federal Reserve consciously chooses to
increase it. Suppose instead that the money
stock rises because ofa rise in the quantity of
money demanded at prevaiting interest rates.
If the Federal Reserve does not entirely
accommodate the increased demand, interest
rates must rise to make the public content to
hold less money than desired at the initial
interest rates. Incidentally, if this analysis is
valid, monetary surprises are primarily due to
changes in money demand rather than in
money supply.
2. Since October 6,1979, the bond markets
have responded about ten times as much as
before to weekly money-supply data.
Specifically, a monetary surprise of one per-
centage point tended to raise interest rates
only 3-7 basis points before October 6, 1979,
but tended to raise them 31-86 basis points
after that date. Since interest rates respond to
monetary surprises as useful economic indica-
tors, bond-market participants must believe
that monetary surprises tell them more now
about the future state of the economy than
they used to do. Apparently, the monetary-
policy change has increased the information


















































'The effects are measured in basis points. The figures in parentheses are standard errors.
+ Statistically significant at the .05 level.
14least has made the market believe so).
3. Before October 6, 1979, monetary
surprises affected short-term interest rates
more than long-term interest rates, and
affected intermediate-term rates even more
than short-term rates. To explain this finding,
suppose that a security's term to maturity indi-
cates the type ofnew information to which its
interest rate is most sensitive. For instance,
the three-menth Treasury-bill rate is most
sensitive to new information about what the
economy will do in the next three months,
whereas the ten-year Treasury-bond rate is
sensitive to new information about what the
economy will do for the next ten years. It then
follows that, before October6, 1979, monetary
surprises conveyed relatively more informa-
tion about what the economy would do six
months to a year in the future (intermediate-
term) than about what it would do for the next
six months (short-term) or after a year (long-
term). Apparently, during the period when the
Federal-funds rate was pegged, changes in
money demand (which produce monetary
surprises) took six months to a year to exert
their greatest effects on the economy.
4. After October 6, 1979, monetary
surprises have affected short-term interest
rates much more than long-term rates.
Apparently, when nonborrowed reserves are
used as the operating instrument, as they are
today, changes in money demand exert their
greatest effects on the economy almost
immediately.
5. Surprises in the Federal-funds rate have
affected short-term interest rates much more
than they have long-term rates. For example,
before October 6, 1979, a surprise ofone per-
centage point would have raised the three-
month Treasury-bill rate 61 basis points, while
raising the twenty-year bond rate by only 14
basis points. Presumably, surprises in the
funds rate tell the bond markets less about the
far future than about the near future.
6. Surprises in the Federal-funds rate have
affected interest rates less since October 6,
1979, than before. In particular, a surprise of
one percentage point raised interest rates by
14-61 basis points before October 6,1979, but
only by 11-35 basis points since then.
Apparently, letting the Federal-funds rate res-
pond freely to market forces has reduced the
information content of rate surprises for pre-
dicting the future state ofthe economy. 15
Table 2
Percentage Decomposition of Increase
in Volatility of Interest Rates
Source of Increased Volatility
Increased Coefficients on
Surprises in Increased Variances of Surprises in
Security Money Supply Federal Funds Rate Money Supply Federal Funds Rate Nonfinancial Factors
Three-month Treasury Bill 28.2 -1.9 7.2 21.3 45.2
Six-month Treasury Bill 35.0 -9.7 8.9 21.6 44.2
Twelve-month Treasury Bill 27.1 -18.2 7.1 23.8 58.2
Three-year Treasury Bill 28.1 -5.0 7.3 12.5 57.1
Five-year Treasury Bond 25.7 -3.2 6.7 8.3 62.6
Seven-year Treasury Bond 24.5 -3.4 6.4 7.0 65.6
Ten-year Treasury Bond 27.8 -2.2 7.2 6.7 60.5
Twenty-year Treasury Bond 27.4 -2.4 7.0 5.7 62.3
15Table 3
Interest-Rate Regressions
for Period Before October 6, 1979
Moving-Average
Coefficients of* Coefficients*
Security EM(.1) EM(-2) EFFR(+1) EFFR Lag 1 Lag 2' Constant· R2 S.E. Q(12)"
Three-month Treasury Bill 0.97 4.65+ .389+ .223+ -.080 -.349+ .0402+ .211 .1551 7.3
(2.12) (2.03) (.093) (.095) (.082) (.082) (.0075)
Six-month Treasury Bill 2.39 4.21+ .425+ .151 + -.009 -.246+ .0381+ .254 .1103 9.6
(1.54) 0.48) (.070) (.070) (.086) (.086) (.0070)
Twelve-month Treasury Bill 2.39 4.59+ .392+ .105+ .131 .0343+ .310 .0971 10.8
(1.39) (1.35) (.060) (.061) (.086) (.0092)
Three-year Treasury Bond 2.63+ 4.14+ .286+ .058 .200+ .0242+ .275 .0883 5.5
(1.26) 0.23) (.055) (.055) (.085) (.0089)
Five-year Treasury Bond 2.57+ 3.42+ .203+ .024 .230+ .0196+ .255 .0733 8.8
(1.04) (1.02) (.046) (.046) (.085) (.0076)
Seven-year Treasury Bond 2.25+ 2.51+ .170+ .021 .176+ .0168+ .217 .0661 8.5
(0.94) (0.92) (.041) (.041) (.086) (.0065)
Ten-year Treasury Bond 1.57 2.45+ .136+ .030 .185+ .0148+ .185 .0624 8.7
(0.89) (0.87) (.039) (.039) (.086) (.0062)
Twenty-year Treasury Bond 1.34 1.77+ .116+ .019 .254+ .0123+ .203 .0514 8.5
(0.73) (0.71) (.032) (.032) (.084) (.0054)
*The standard error of each coefficient appears below it in parentheses.
**Q(2) is the Box-Pierce statistic, a measure ofserial correlation. None ofthe entries in this column indicates significant
serial correlation at any conventional significance level.
+Statistically significant at the .05 level.
Table 4
Interest-Rate Regressions




Sec...1ty EM(-1) EM(-2) EM(-3)EFFRI+1) EFFR EFFR(-1)EFFRI·2)EFFR(.3)EFFRI·4) Lag1 Lag2 Constant· R2 S.E. 0(12)**
Three-month Treasury Bill 26.1+ 36.6+ 23.0+ ·.070 181 -.020 .224+ .226+ -.191+ .321+ .641 + .01S .736 .3832 7.2
0.8) OS) (7,8) (099) CI 10) CliO) CI04) (094) (089) C13I) CI32) CI06)
Six-month Treasury Bill 2S.1+ 3S.F 22.2+ -.079 137 -.007 116 .199+ -,106 .420+ .S64+ 009 .763 .324S 12,3
(6.S) (6.8) (67) C08S) (096) C09S) (089) (082) C07S) CI39) CI40) C09l)
Twelve·month Treasury Bill 21.S+ 26.9+ 12.8+ .143 .149+ .170 .314+ .043 .S60 .3603 4.6
0.0) 0.4) 0.2) (077) C07S) CI48) (.]SS) (073)
Three·year Treasury Bond 26.3+ 27.F 132 .148 .046 .OSO .441 .38S4 7.3
0.4) 0.4) (080) (080) O.SS) (OSS)
Five-year Treasury Bond 22.0+ 22.6+ .126 .060 .198 .OSI .431 .3399 4.6
(6.S) (6.S) C07l) C07l) US]) COS6)
Seven-year Teasury Bond 20.2+ 18.2+ .094 .046 .174 .049 .393 .3090 3.6
(6.01 (S.9) (064) (064) CI52) COSO)
Ten-year Treasury Bond 19.9+ IS.8+ .087 .OS3 .098 .048 .419 .2646 3.0
(S.I) (S.I) COS5) C05S) CIS4) (040)
Twenty-year Treasury Bond I7.S+ 13.7+ .042 .06S .092 .OSO .395 .2364 3.S
(4.S) (4.S) (049) (049) CIS3) C03S)
'The standard error ofeach coefficient appears below it in parenthe6es.
"Q(12) is the Box-Pierce statistic. a measure ofserial correlation. None ofthe entries in this column indicates significant serial correlation at any con-
ventional significance level.
+Statistically significant at the .OS level.
16IV. Decomposition of the Increase in Rate Volatility
In this section, we attempt to explain why
interestrates have become much more volatile
since October 6, 1979, than they were pre-
viously.
Equation (7) implies thatVR, the volatility16
of the bond rate R, is
VR = (b2+ c2)VEM
+ (d2+ e2) VEFFR + VV,
where VEM, VEFFR and VV are the variances
ofsurprises in money, the Federal-funds rate,
and the error term; and b, c, d and e are the
coefficients of EM(-1), EM(-2),
EFFR(+1) and EFFR. To a first approxima-
tion, differencing this equation then yields
DVR = (D(b2+ c2»VEM
+ (b2+ c2) DVEM
+ (D(d2+ e2»::::':V=E=F=ER=- (8)
+ (d2+ e2)DVEFFR+ DVV
where DVR, D(b2+ c2), DVEM, D(d2+ e2),
DVEFFR and DVV are the differences in VR,
b2 + c2, VEM, d2 + e2, VEFFR and VV be-
tween the two sample periods; and VEM, (b2
+ c2), VEFFR and (d2 + e2) are the average
values ofVEM, b2+ c2, VEFFR and d2+ e2in
the two sample periods.
One can decompose the increase in volatility
ofeach interest rate into five components due
to 1) larger coefficients on monetary surprises;
2) larger variance of monetary surprises; 3)
larger coefficients on the surprises in the
Federal-funds rate; 4) larger variance of
Funds-rate surprises; and 5) a more variable
error term. Since the first four terms are sup-
posed to capture the effects of monetary
changes, the last term may be called the non-
monetary component.
We have used equation (8) and the empiri-
cal results reported in Tables 3 and 4 to calcu-
late the fraction of the interest-rate volatility
attributable to each component. 17 The results
appear in Table 2. Since equation (8) approxi-
mates an identity, the decomposition in Table
17
2 has no economic content by itself. To give it
content, we have made four specific assump-
tions, as follows.
1. The nonmonetary component is indepen-
dent of monetary policy. If the money supply
and the Federal-funds rate provide a suffi-
ciently complete characterization ofmonetary
policy, and ifequations (3)-(6) adequately de-
scribe that policy, this assumption follows
immediately.
2. Changes in monetary policy have little
effect on· the variance of monetary surprises.
This variance presumably reflects the weekly
variance of money demand or of bank-loan
demand, as Judd and Scadding argue
elsewhere in this issue of the Economic
Review. Monetary policy may well be able to
control the money supply closely over periods
as long as a quarter or two, but has little con-
trol on a weekly basis. Inother words, ashift in
monetary policy can change the coefficients in
an equation like (3) or (5), but can have little
effect on the standard error.
3. The coefficients band c rose because the
equation generating the money supply
changed from (3) to (5), and because the
Federal Reserve raised the coefficient on EM
substantially (see equations (4) and (6».
These changes were part ofthe Fed's effort to
target the money supply. Since stricter target-
ing makes monetary surprises more informa-
tive, interest rates responded much more to
monetary surprises after October 6, 1979 than
before.
4. The coefficients d and e fell because ofa
rise in the variance of surprises in the funds
rate. This increased variance reduced •the
information contained in monetary surprises,
thereby causing interest rates to respond less
to any given surprise.
Given these assumptions, the decomposi-
tion procedure (Table 2) suggests several
important implications. First, factors beyond
the Federal Reserve's direct control accounted
for most of the increased volatility of interest
rates. Nonfinancial factors accounted for about
45 percent of the increased volatility ofshort-term interest rates, and for up to 65 percent of
the volatility of intermediate-and long-term
rates. Factors causing monetary surprises con-
tributed about 7 percent more, so that all
sources together accounted for 52-72 percent
ofthe increased volatility. Second, making the
Federal-funds rate more sensitive to monetary
surprises generally resulted in 25-30 percentof
the increased interest-rate volatility. Third,
any Federal Reserve attempt to reduce the
variance ofsurprises in the Federal-funds rate
after October 6, 1979 would have reduced
interest-rate volatility, butsignificantlyso only
for short-term rates. For example, preventing
the variance ofsurprises in the funds rate from
rising would have reduced the volatility of the
three-month Treasury-bill rate by 19.4 percent
(=21.3 - 1.9), but would have reduced the
volatility of the twenty-year Treasury-bond
rate by only 3.3 percent (=5.7 - 2.4).
V. Summary and Conclusions
The efficient-markets hypothesis implies
that interest rates adjust immediately to new
information. Our empirical results support this
hypothesis for long-term interest rates, since
they suggest that bond markets quickly use
new information about the money supply and
the Federal-funds rate.
The Federal Reserve's October 6, 1979
change in monetary policy altered the way that
bond markets set interest rates. Previously, a
monetary surprise of one percentage point
raised interest rates by 3-7 basis points, and a
surpris~ of one percentage point in the
Federal-funds rate raised rates by 14-61 basis
points. After October 1979, such surprises
would have raised interest rates by 31-86 and
11-35 basis points, respectively. Clearly,
monetary surprises have become rather impor-
tant, while surprises in the Federal-funds rate
have become substantially less important.
Analysis of the decomposition of rate
volatility suggests that 52-72 percent of the
increased volatility resulted from factors not
under the Federal Reserve's direct control.
About 25-30 percent ofthe increased volatility
resulted from making the Federal-funds rate
respond to monetary surprises. The rest came
from freeing the Federal-funds rate to respond
to nonmonetary market forces; this source was
responsible for as much as 20 percent of the
increased volatility ofshort-term rates, but for
as little as 3 percent ofthe increased volatility
of long-term rates.
These findings suggest several public-policy
implications - primarily, that the Federal
Reserve has not been responsible for most of
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the increase in interest-rate volatility. The
post-October 1979 period has seen many
unexpected events that could have changed
interest rates or shifted the demand for money.
Forexample, militant students seized hostages
in Iran, the Russians invaded Afghanistan,
decontrol ofoil prices began, President Carter
authorized credit controls, the silver market
collapsed, and the U.S. underwent a radical
change in political direction. Clearly, none of
these events was a direct consequence of the
monetary-policy change. Furthermore, future
years may see a return to normalcy, with a
sharp reduction in interest-rate volatility.
Second, the Federal Reserve's decision to
move the Federal-funds rate more in response
to monetary surprises entails more volatility of
both long-and short-term interest rates. Itpro-
bably also helps the Federal Reserve to hit its
targets for money growth and hence for infla-
tion. For this reason, the increased volatility -
and the resultant reduction in capital forma-
tion and redirection ofcapital towards shorter-
lived assets - may be the price that must be
paid to hit these targets. The price has certainly
proven to be higher than many believed before
October 6, 1979. Whether this price has been
too high depends on how important it is to hit
monetary targets, and how much the increased
volatility reduces savings and changes the
composition of investment.
Finally, Federal Reserve intervention in the
market for reserves to eliminate surprises in
the Federal-funds rate would mean only a
slight reduction in the volatility of long-term
interest rates. If the Federal Reserve inter-vened, however, it would simply replacepri-
vate agents as the speculator in that market.
This paper has established no presurnption
that the Fed is a better speculator than private
agents - and even ifit were, itwould not need
to intervene directly itself. A timely and credi-
ble public announcementoftheFed'ssuperior
information would make the market as effi-
cientas it could ever be - simply because effi-
cient securities markets make optimal uSe of
an the information available to them.
FOOTNOTES
1. For example, see Herman (1981).
2. See Fama (1970) for a discussion of the efficient-
markets hypothesis and for a review of some empiri-
cal work supporting it.
3. Mishkin (1980) has shown that one-quarter hold-
ing-period yields of long-term bonds are indeed domi-
nated by capital gains and losses.
4. Clearly, I am assuming here that a linear predictor
is best.
5. I have used unadjusted data, because I believe
that the method by which the Federal Reserve obtains
its seasonally adjusted data does more harm than
good.
6. Henceforth, I shall refer to these sample periods
as "before October 6, 1979" and "after October 6,
1979."
7. This methodology entails examining the sample
autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of these
series, identifying univariate processes for each
series, fitting these processes, subjecting each fitted
process to tests of model adequacy, crosscorrelating
the residuals of these processes, identifying the
bivariate process generating the two series, fitting
this bivariate process, and testing whether the fitted
process is adequate. See Box and Jenkins (1976)
and Granger and Newbold (1977) for a complete
description of this methodology.
8. For example, equations (3) and (4) take the form
(jgnoring the constant term)
z = H(L)e,
where z is a vector composed of GM -GM(-52) and
DFFR; e is a vector composed of EM and EFFR:and
H(L) is a 2x2 matrix in polynomials in the lag operator




W 1(L) =I-J1L - J2L2 - .
Then z = J1z(-1) + J2 z(-) + + e.
LetZ be the vector obtained by stacking z, z(-1), ...,
and let E be the vector with EM in the first entry, EFFR




Z = AZ(-1) + E,
where J1 J2 J3
100
A= 0 I 0
o 0 I
9. This statement ignores the constant term and
assumes that a year has exactly 52 weeks.
10. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, I
assume that
where dril is the change in the bond rate from the end
of day i-1 of week t to the end of day i of week t (day 0
of week t is day 7 of week t - 1), and Vit is a serially
uncorrelated error term. This equation implies that
DRlt,the change in the bond rate from the end of day i
of week t - 1 to the end of day i of week t, is
7 i
DRIt = IVjt-1 +IVjl
i+1 i+1 1
Averaging this equation then yields
(*) DR =U(j-1) Vil-1 + ~(8-j)vj/7
Therefore, DR and DR (-1) have the nonzero
covariance
(**)[}(8-iHi-1)Var V It-]/49
and DR and DR(-j), i>1, have a zero covariance, it
follows that DR is the first-order moving average. Note
that DR has the representation
DR = U + g U(-1),
where U is a serially uncorrelated error term and g is
a parameter. The parameter g and the variance of Uare chosen so that DR has the samevarianceas(·)
implies and DR and DR(-1) have the covariance (••).
11. It is hard to be more specific about when EM(~1)
affects the bond markets, because M~1 B data may
leak out before its official release date. I assUme,
however, that leakage occurs after the beginning of
the week.
12. The sum of the coefficients on EFFR(+1) and
EFFR consistently estimates the coefficient that one
would obtain using Federal-funds rate data averaged
over weeks ending on Saturdays. First, let Xl be
EFFR(+1), X2 be EFFR, Y be DR, and X be the EFFR
that would be used if the right data were available.
Next, let Zl and Z2 be the parts of X that Xl and X2





By construction, Zl' Z2' E1 and E2 are mutually
orthogonal and Xl' X2and X have the same variance.
Then, let be 0: the fraction of the variance of X con-
tributed by Zl and 1-0: be the fraction contributed by
Z2' Finally, let
Y = 13K + V,
where V is orthogonal to Z l'Z2'E1and E2' Then
Y =f3(X1 +X2) +V -f3(E1+ E2).
Since Xl and X2 are orthogonal, the least-squares
estimator b1ofthe coefficient on Xl is
IX1Y/IX¥.
Its probability limit is therefore
plim (IX1l/3(X1+ X2) + V - f3(E1+ E2))/IX¥)
=13 + 13 plim (IX1X2/IX¥)
+plim (IX1V/IX12) -f3plim (IX1(E1E2)/IX12)






Similarly, the probability limit of the least-squares
estimator b2of the coefficient on X2is
plim (b2= (1-0:)13
Hence
plim (b1+ b2) = 13
13. Strictly speaking, the efficient-markets
hypothesis only rules out long lag structures in the
equations for long-term interest rates. I therefore
conclude that the data support the efficient-markets
hypothesis.
14. If the error term V is a first-order moving average,
it takes the form
V = U + g U(-1),
where U is a seriaily uncorrelated error term and g is
a parameter. If V is a second-order moving avarage,
V= U + gU(-1) + hU(-2),
where h is a parameter. The columns labeled Lag 1
and Lag 2 provide the estimates of g and h.
15. Since October 6, 1979, the Federal-funds rate
has conveyed more information about supply and
demand in the market for reserves, even though it has
conveyed less information about the aggregate econ-
omy.
16. I define the volatility of an interest rate to be the
variance of its weekly differences.
17. Some of the equations reported in Tables 1 and 2
have longer lag structures than equation (8) recog-
nizes. For these equations, I have modified equation
(8) appropriately.
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